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This paper provides a political economy analysis of why the US Federal Reserve 
unprecedentedly established temporary reciprocal swap lines with a select four emerging 
market economies during the global financial crisis of 2008-09, thus acting as global 
lender of last resort for US dollars. It argues that the swap lines reflected the great US need 
to reinforce its ties with major emerging market economies at that time, when a new global 
economic governance system had emerged—led by the Group of Twenty, which 
encompassed these economies among its members. Yet it also stresses the uniqueness of 
the international situation at that time, implying a low likelihood of the Federal Reserve 
providing swap lines for emerging market economies again in future systemic crises, and 







The impact of the 2007 US subprime mortgage crisis initially seemed limited largely to the 
United States and some other advanced economies in Europe. After Lehman Brothers, the 
fourth-largest US investment bank, collapsed in mid-September 2008, however, abrupt 
deleveraging began in advanced economies, and the crisis evolved into the first global 
financial crisis of the postwar era. A number of emerging market economies (EMEs) as a 
result faced sudden stops and substantial capital flow reversals, fell short of US dollar 
liquidity, and thereby suffered detrimental financial instability—including collapses in 
value of their currencies, drastic hikes in the credit default swap (CDS) premiums for their 
sovereign bonds, stock market crashes, etc. Within just one month after the Lehman 
Brothers collapse, Iceland, Pakistan, Hungary, Ukraine and Belarus had all applied for 
bailouts from the International Monetary Fund (IMF).             
 As the crisis spread rapidly to EMEs, the US Federal Reserve (hereafter Fed) 
established temporary reciprocal swap lines with the central banks of four EMEs—Brazil, 
Mexico, South Korea (hereafter Korea), and Singapore—in order to provide them dollar 
liquidity; it thereby acted as a global lender of last resort for dollars, just as it had played 
its traditional role as lender of last resort in the US domestic markets. The swap lines 
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offered each of the four EMEs access to a maximum of 30 billion dollars through 1 
February 2010,1 and contributed substantially to their financial stabilization.2    
 Why did the Fed selectively offer swap lines to these four EMEs? This question is of 
great significance for the world monetary system in at least two respects. Firstly, the swap 
lines to the four EMEs were unprecedented in the history of the Fed. The global crisis was 
the first time that the Fed had ever acted as a dollar lender of last resort to support EMEs. 
Although the Fed had operated swap lines with select advanced economies since the early 
1960s, it had never offered them to any EMEs except Mexico, a next-door US neighbor, 
during any previous crises including the 1997 Asian currency crisis. The question is thus in 
itself an important issue in the history of the world monetary system. Despite its historical 
importance, however, there has until now been very little research on it, with a few notable 
exceptions such as Aizenman and Pasricha (2010), which will be discussed in detail later. 
 Secondly, analysis of this issue may provide significant implications for the on-going 
discussions on the need to strengthen the global financial safety net to enable effective 
provision of short-term liquidity assistance, especially for innocent crisis ‘bystanders’ 
victimized by systemic crises. Systemic crises are very virulent, since they victimize 
innocent economies irrespective of their domestic economic fundamentals by triggering 
panics and chain reactions across markets. And according to research by the IMF (Bi and 
Lanau, 2011), the number of crisis bystander EME victims of the global financial crisis 
surpassed twenty. The Group of Twenty (G20) has since its 2010 Seoul summit in fact 
been discussing enhancement of the global financial safety net, to prevent global crisis 
recurrence and preclude victimization of innocent crisis bystanders, but the progress has to 
date been very limited. In this regard, analysis of the Fed’s main motivation in establishing 
the swap lines with the four EMEs is important, as the findings can provide helpful 
insights as to whether the Fed might again provide swap lines for crisis bystander EMEs in 
future systemic crises, and thus also as to the need for strengthening the global financial 
safety net.    
This research argues that the Fed’s swap lines with the four EMEs reflected a particular 
US need at the time to strengthen its relationships with major EMEs. In more detail, as the 
US crisis spread beyond its epicentre, evolving into a global crisis, the main pillar of 
global economic governance had begun to shift from the traditional ‘club model’ led by a 
handful of advanced economies—namely, the Group of Eight (G8)—to a more inclusive 
institution encompassing major EMEs—that is, the G20—in order to cope with the crisis 
effectively. Yet significant conflict also emerged between the United States and Europe, 
over how to reform the international monetary and financial systems. Under these 
conditions, the US appears to have had a strong incentive to reinforce its ties with major 
EMEs in order to preserve its influence in the new system of global economic governance, 
and the Fed swap lines appear to have been useful means serving this need well. The Fed 
in addition appears, as a second consideration, to have been concerned about the EMEs’ 
                                                 
1 The initial duration of the four swap lines was until 30 April 2009, but it was extended twice to 1 February 
2010.  
2 According to Aizenman and Pasricha (2010), the values of the four EMEs’ currencies increased by an 
average 4 percentage points against the dollar one day after establishment of the swap arrangements, while 
those of the currencies of another 23 EMEs declined by 0.15 percentage points on average. The difference 
between the two groups was statistically significant, suggesting that the swap lines played a significant role 
in stabilizing the exchange rates of the four EMEs in the short term. That study also finds, for the four EMEs, 
that the CDS spreads on their five-year sovereign bonds fell by an average 19.5 percentage points one day 
after swap line establishment, while for the other EMEs the average drop in their five-year sovereign bond 
CDS spread was 15.8 percentage points only; the difference between the two groups was not statistically 
significant, however.  
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potentials to negatively impact the US economy should they fall into crisis. 
This study pays due attention as well to the major alternative explanations of the Fed’s 
decision to open swap lines with the select four EMEs, including prevention of crisis 
contagion to systemically important EMEs with sound domestic fundamentals, protection 
of US banking interests, and preservation of the status of the dollar as the leading 
international currency. None of these explanations prove applicable to all four swap cases, 
however. 
The findings of this study show that the situation in which the Fed offered the swap 
lines to the four EMEs was a quite unique moment in the history of the world economy. 
And it may thus not be easy to expect the Fed to reassume the role of global lender of last 
resort for EMEs in the future. The need for a more powerful global financial safety net is 
therefore implied, to prevent future systemic crisis and avoid creation of innocent 
bystander victim EMEs.        
This paper is organized as follows. The next section highlights the unprecedented 
nature of the Fed’s swap lines with the four EMEs, by exploring the history of its swap 
lines with foreign economies. The two sections following then analyse the factors that may 
have influenced the Fed’s unprecedented decision to establish these swap lines with the 
four EMEs. And the final section summarizes the findings, discusses their implications 
with regard to the global financial safety net, and briefly deals with one major potential 
criticism of this study.    
 
 
II. UNPRECEDENTED SWAP LINES WITH EMEs 
 
The Fed’s swap lines to the four EMEs were an event of great significance in the history of 
international monetary cooperation, give that it was the first time the Fed had used its 
power to issue dollars to provide dollar liquidity to a group of EMEs, acting as a global 
lender of last resort. Although the Fed has operated reciprocal swap lines with foreign 
central banks for about a half-century, its swap line partners have been limited to a handful 
of advanced economies only.     
 The Fed first created swap lines (also called ‘reciprocal currency arrangements’) in the 
early 1960s, in order to obtain foreign exchange to intervene in the foreign exchange 
markets.3 The international monetary system at that time was the Bretton Woods system, a 
system of fixed exchange rates under which foreign currencies were pegged to the dollar 
and the dollar was convertible to gold at a fixed official price of 35 dollars per ounce. The 
US balance of payments deficits had increased significantly in the early 1960s, bringing 
about growing concerns that the United State might fail to maintain the fixed exchange 
rate system. In these circumstances, in order to preserve the system the Fed launched for 
the first time swap lines, worth a total 0.7 billion dollars, with the central banks of seven 
advanced economies—Belgium, Canada, France, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the United 
Kingdom and West Germany—and with the Bank for International Settlement (BIS).4 In 
March 1973 the Fed established additional swap lines with a total value of 4.2 billion 
dollars with the central banks of another six advanced economies—Austria, Denmark, Italy, 
                                                 
3 In the 1920s, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York directly established swap lines with foreign central 
banks, aiming to make their currencies convertible. However, the Fed Board of Governors was later granted, 
by the Banking Act of 1933, the power to prevent the New York Fed from dealing directly with foreign banks 
(Hetzel, 1996).    
4 Meanwhile, the US Treasury also resumed foreign exchange market interventions from March 1961 to 
stabilize the dollar’s exchange rates, for the first time since the mid-1930s (US Treasury, 2009).  
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Japan, Norway and Sweden—as well as with US neighbor Mexico, while increasing the 
total size of its previous swap lines with the seven economies and the BIS to 7.5 billion 
dollars (Abrams, 1979). Those swap lines were standing arrangements, aimed at providing 
short-term foreign exchange liquidity (Humpage, 1994).5 
 The swaps were used by the Fed to maintain the value of the dollar, but foreign central 
banks also used them actively when their currencies came under depreciation pressures 
(Federal Reserve, 2005). Between 1962 and 1971, for instance, when the Bretton Woods 
system collapsed, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Italy, Japan, the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom withdrew 50 million, 770 million, 520 million, 150 
million, 1,160 million, 1,450 million, 80 million, 250 million and 8,680 million dollars 
respectively through their swap lines with the Fed (Holmes and Pardee, 1976).  
 After the international monetary system moved to a floating exchange rate system with 
the downfall of Bretton Woods, the frequency of swap activation declined even despite 
increases in the volumes of the swap lines between the Fed and the foreign central banks—
due to factors such as doubts about the effectiveness of foreign exchange market 
intervention and the rise in use of foreign exchange reserves for intervention instead 
(Abrams, 1979; Federal Reserve, 2005). In the end, with the swap lines having not been 
activated for a long time, the Fed finally retracted them in 1998 through mutual consent 
with its swap counterparty banks, with the exceptions of those with Canada and Mexico 
which persisted as part of the North American Free Trade Agreement (Federal Reserve, 
2005; US Treasury, 2009).6 
 Following the 9-11 terrorist attacks in 2001 the Fed opened temporary reciprocal swap 
lines to provide dollar liquidity for foreign economies. The central banks included in these 
arrangements also consisted of advanced country banks only, as in the case of the previous 
standing swap lines. The Fed established a swap line worth 50 billion dollars with the 
European Central Bank (ECB) and one worth 30 billion dollars with the United Kingdom, 
and temporarily increased the volume of its line with Canada from 2 to 10 billion dollars. 
The durations of the swap lines were thirty days, and the ECB withdrew 23.5 billion 
dollars through its line (Federal Reserve, 2005). 
 When the global financial crisis erupted in the late 2000s, the Fed reopened temporary 
reciprocal swap lines to provide dollar liquidity for foreign economies. And in the early 
stages the swap line counterparties were again limited to central banks of advanced 
economies. The Fed first established lines with the ECB and Switzerland on 12 December 
2007, and then gradually expanded coverage as the crisis spread to the world. On 18 
September 2008, right after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, it created swap lines with 
Canada, Japan and the United Kingdom, and six days later on 24 September with Australia, 
Denmark, Norway and Sweden. A month later, on 28 October, the Fed set up a swap line 
with New Zealand as well, bringing the total number of swap lines established with 
advanced economies to ten before it then offered lines to the four EMEs. The sizes of the 
swap lines were initially 10 billion, 10 billion, 5 billion, 5 billion and 10 billion dollars for 
Australia, Canada, Denmark, Norway and Sweden, respectively, but were later doubled. 
Meanwhile, the amounts were initially 20 billion, 60 billion, 4 billion and 40 billion dollars 
for the ECB, Japan, Switzerland and the United Kingdom, before the limits on the 
quantities of dollars that could be withdrawn through these lines were then removed in 
mid-October. 
                                                 
5 The swap lines were typically terminated in three months, and were renewable only once (Humpage, 1994). 
6 The amounts of the swap lines were 2 billion and 3 billion dollars for Canada and Mexico, respectively 
(Federal Reserve, 2005; US Treasury, 2009) 
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 The history of the Fed’s swap lines over the last half-century thus powerfully illustrates 
its swap lines with the four EMEs during the global financial crisis to have been very 
exceptional. Access to the Fed’s dollar pipeline has long been permitted to select groups of 
advanced economies only. One may argue that the Fed offered swap lines to EMEs during 
the global crisis simply because the crisis had spread to them. It should be stressed, 
however, that even though EMEs also suffered from financial instability in the wake of 9-
11, the Fed also established lines with select advanced economies only at that time.7 As 
will be discussed in detail later, moreover, the Fed had never previously provided swap 
lines to any EMEs, with the exception of Mexico, when they had been hit by financial 
crises and requested bailouts from the IMF. It is thus unlikely that the Fed offered swap 
lines to the four EMEs merely because the crisis having spread to them. Why then did it 
extraordinarily establish these swap lines with the four EMEs during the global crisis?  
 
 
III. RISE IN US NEED TO STRENGTHEN TIES WITH EMES 
 
A new form of global economic governance system encompassing EMEs among its main 
members emerged to cope with the global financial crisis. In this new environment, the 
United States encountered a strong need for reinforcing its relationships with major EMEs.  
 
a. Emergence of new global economic governance system  
 
As the global crisis deepened, a significant change occurred, that marked a turning point in 
the history of global economic governance. This was the rise of the G20, whose 
membership includes not only advanced but also major emerging market economies, as the 
premier forum for global economic governance, beginning with its first summit in 
November 2008 to discuss measures for dealing with the crisis and reforming the global 
monetary and financial systems. The emergence of the G20 as the new centre for world 
economic management meant the end of the traditional club model of global economic 
governance led by a small number of advanced economies—that is, the G8—with EMEs 
being finally allowed seats at the head table of global economic governance.8      
 The shift of the central pillar of global economic governance to a system that included 
EMEs reflected, albeit belatedly, the significant rise in their importance on the global 
economic stage. Indeed, between 1992 and 2007 the share of the G8 in world real gross 
domestic product (GDP) had fallen from 68.8 to 57.8 percent, while that of the G20 less 
the G8 had risen from 12 to 19.3 percent. This increase in the share of EMEs in world 
GDP had been particularly great since the 2000s, with that of the G20 less the G8 rising 
from 14.8 percent in 2002 to 19.3 percent in 2007. EMEs had also been the locomotive of 
world growth in recent years, as shown by the fact that the annual real GDP growth rate of 
the G20 less the G8 amounted to an average 4.9 percent between 2000 and 2007, while 
that of the G8 averaged only 2.7 percent during the period.    
 Given this considerable increase in EMEs’ role in the world economy, it was not 
feasible to deal with the global crisis effectively and address reform of the global monetary 
                                                 
7 The J.P. Morgan Emerging Markets Bond Index spread rose from 827 basis points (bps) on 31 August 2001 
to 937 bps on 28 September and 1,001 bps on 31 October.  
8 Although the G20 was established in 1999 in the wake of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, it had held only 
Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors’ Meetings prior to the first G20 summit in November 2008, 
and the G8 had still played the central role in global economic governance up until the time of the summit.  
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and financial systems by cooperation among a few advanced economies only, without 
EME participation. The G8 had in fact been long criticized for its weak representativeness 
and legitimacy, as well as its low effectiveness. Welcoming the first G20 summit, the 
influential Financial Times indeed wrote in its editorial comment (2008):  
 
The Group of 20 summit marks a break with a practice that has outlived its usefulness. 
The notion that a club of just eight rich democracies could run the world in normal times, 
let alone through the current turmoil, was always implausible. It would be pointless even 
trying without Brazil, China and India. Only by including these countries will it be 
possible to find a way out of the current crisis and agree longer-term reforms of the 
global financial architecture. 
 
In fact, when then White House Press Secretary Dana Perino was questioned, in a press 
briefing regarding the first G20 summit, as to why it was necessary to gather together the 
whole group of G20 economies, a ‘rather unwieldy size group’ in the questioner’s words, 
she answered:  
 
[I]t [the G20] includes developed and developing nations. And the President thinks it’s 
very important to include developing nations, because they have emerging markets, 
they’re important on a variety of levels to the global economy, and their input is 
important. 
 
b. US-European conflict and US incentive for closer relationships with EMEs  
 
While the role of EMEs in global economic governance was thus growing, the United 
States was encountering significant conflicts with Europe over how to reform the 
international monetary and financial systems, despite their agreement to hold the first G20 
summit. For example, the US position on strengthening of financial regulation was more 
lenient than that of the European Union (Giles, 2008; Ward et al., 2008). The United States 
was also more jealous of its national sovereignty, while the Europeans were pushing for 
the creation of a new global regulator for the international financial system (Rachman, 
2008). Europe in addition wished for agreement on a ‘new Bretton Woods’, a redesign of 
the postwar global financial architecture, while the United States was against such an idea 
(Hall and Eaglesham, 2008). French President Nicolas Sarkozy was moreover harshly 
critical of the dollar-centred international monetary system (Parker, 2008; Thomson 
Financial News, 2008). There was also a likelihood that major EME G20 members such as 
China, Russia and India might propose radical ideas for international monetary and 
financial system reform. Meanwhile, given that the crisis had originated from the United 
States, its influence in the international community faced the possibility of decline.  
 Under these circumstances, the US is likely to have had a strong incentive to tighten its 
relations with major EMEs, in order to preserve its influence within the G20, and Brazil, 
Korea and Mexico to have seemed suitable partners for it in this regard. Mexico was a US 
neighbor that had always been an important consideration in US foreign economic policy. 
As indicated earlier, it was the only EME that had had swap lines with the Fed prior to the 
global crisis. Meanwhile, Brazil and Korea were scheduled to take rotating annual 
presidencies of the G20 for 2008 and 2010, respectively, thereby both being included in 
the 2009 G20 Troika of the former, contemporary and subsequent chairs. The two 
countries were thus in a position in which they could play significant roles in the coming 
G20 meetings.     
 In this situation, the provision of Fed swap lines for these four EMEs with their 
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growing financial instability would have thus seemed likely to help the United State 
significantly in reinforcing its relationships with them. The EMEs could have of course 
sought alternative sources of external financial assistance at that time, particularly from the 
IMF. And on the very day when the Fed established its swap lines with the four EMEs, the 
IMF in fact introduced a new lending facility, the Short-Term Liquidity Facility, aimed at 
providing quick-disbursement financing for economies having strong policies but facing 
temporary liquidity problems. The facility’s access limit was five times a member’s quota, 
which would have meant 23 billion, 22 billion, 24 billion and 7 billion dollars for Brazil, 
Korea, Mexico and Singapore, respectively. These EMEs were very reluctant to request 
IMF support, however, due to their fears of the associated stigma, both political and 
market, and were disposed to avoid it whenever possible. For instance, then Korean 
Finance Minister Kang Man-soo commented that: ‘Korea had no plan to apply for a 
lending facility of the IMF, due to Koreans’ (hostile) sentiment toward it’ (MSFK, 2008b). 
And indeed, no country ever did apply for the new IMF lending facility, leading it being 
eventually abolished. It is also worth noting that, although a total of fourteen countries 
applied for the IMF’s Stand-By Arrangements over eight months after the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers, none of them were G20 members.9 
 The argument that the US need to strengthen its ties with the four EMEs is likely to 
have had a significant impact on the Fed’s establishment of its swap lines with them is 
strongly supported by the fact that the Fed was initially opposed to offering swap lines to 
EMEs, but changed its position from around the time when holding of the first G20 
summit was agreed on.10 Such a change in the Fed’s stance on establishing swap lines 
with EMEs is clearly illustrated by the case of its swap line with Korea. As the Fed 
expanded its swap lines to a growing number of (advanced) economies, Korea found itself 
facing a serious dollar liquidity shortage and began making strong requests for a Fed swap 
line.11 The Fed rejected the Korean request through mid-October, however, for reasons 
including that the Korean won was not an international currency, that the Korean credit 
rating was not triple A, and that, if it were to establish a swap line with that country, 
requests from other EMEs for swap lines would follow.12 
 The Fed begun to change its position on a swap line with Korea from mid-October, 
however, the very time when US President George W. Bush decided to host the first G20 
summit. On 18 October, President Bush, President Sarkozy and European Commission 
President José Manuel Barroso announced that the first international summit to discuss 
how to deal with the global financial crisis would be held. And four days later, on 22 
October, President Bush announced that the United States would host the first G20 summit 
on 15 November 2008 (Koch, 2008; Perion, 2008; Pulizzi, 2008). Two days later, 
meanwhile, on 24 October, the Korean central bank was asked by the Fed to submit an 
official document requesting establishment of a swap line with it (Chung, 2008), and on 
                                                 
9 The IMF created another new lending instrument in March 2009, the Flexible Credit Line, which did not 
attach ex post conditionality, in order to provide financial assistance for EMEs with strong economic 
fundamentals. Similar to the case with the SLF, however, only four countries have used it as of the end of 
2011.     
10 In illustrating the change in the Fed’s attitude toward establishing swap lines with EMEs, this paper 
focuses on the Korean case only, due to availability of research materials. 
11 In mid-October 2008, the exchange rate of the Korean won against the US dollar soared beyond 1,300 
won per dollar, the CDS spread on five-year sovereign bonds surpassed 300 bps, and the one-year currency 
swap rate became negative—all implying a serious dollar liquidity shortage.    
12 The Fed’s rejection of the Korean request for a swap line has been confirmed by several Korean 
government officials’ and central bankers’ comments reported in newspapers at that time. In addition, I 
would like to stress that I myself was working for the Korean central bank. 
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that same day then Korean Assistant Deputy Finance Minister Shin Je Yoon, who was in 
Beijing, received a call from a US government official informing him that a Fed swap line 
was likely to be offered to Korea (Lee, 2008). This chronology of the Fed’s swap line with 
Korea strongly suggests a linkage between inauguration of the first G20 summit and the 
Fed’s swap lines with the four EMEs.   
 Indeed, then US Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson commented that, with the first G20 
summit approaching, the Fed’s swap lines with the four EMEs demonstrated strong 
international cooperation (Kim, 2008b). On October 21, moreover, when the negotiation 
over the swap line for Korea was proceeding, President Bush called Korean President Lee 
Myung-bak, requesting that Korea contribute to international cooperation to overcome the 
global crisis, and President Lee responded favorably; a Korean government official judged 
the phone conversation between the two leaders ‘a process of actually confirming the 
establishment of a Fed swap line with Korea’ (Kim, 2008c). Another Korean government 
official also commented: ‘Although there are no explicit conditions attached, it [the swap 
line] could be understood as a US request for support of its position in the forthcoming 
reform of the international financial system’ (Park, 2008). The outcomes of the first G20 
summit were in fact largely favorable to US interests rather than European ones.13 
 One may correctly note that Singapore was not a G20 member. Yet, although this is 
true, Singapore was one of the exclusive members of the Financial Stability Forum (FSF). 
The FSF, founded in 1999 with the goal of strengthening international cooperation in order 
to enhance international financial market stability, was a central pillar of global financial 
governance, acting as a key setter of international financial standards such as the ‘12 Key 
Standards for Sound Financial Systems’. FSF membership was very exclusive, however, 
consisting mainly of the Group of Seven economies and a few other advanced economies; 
among EMEs, only Singapore and Hong Kong were members. The strengthening of its ties 
with Singapore—a FSF member—was thus likely to be as important to the United States 
as doing so with G20 members Brazil, Korea and Mexico, from the standpoint of 
maintaining its influence in the process of reforming the international financial system.14            
 
c. Consideration of potential damage to US economy 
 
There is one more important point to stress with regard to the Fed’s swap lines with the 
four EMEs. This is that the Fed offered swap lines only to a select group of G20 members. 
It for instance rejected a request for a swap line from Indonesia, which was also a G20 
member (Aglionby, 2009). This suggests that the Fed may have had some other 
considerations as well in deciding its swap line partners, in addition to its need to 
strengthen the US relationships with EMEs having growing influence in global economic 
governance.  
One important consideration, among others, appears to have been the capacities of the 
EMEs concerned to negatively influence the US economy should they fall into crises.15 
                                                 
13 For example, the first G20 summit reconfirmed the US position that the financial reform should not 
impede financial innovation and financial transactions, while failing to agree to the European proposal to 
create a global financial regulator. 
14 The FSF was replaced in April 2009 by the Financial Stability Board, whose membership encompassed all 
G20 members. 
15 When Indonesia requested a Fed swap line, its sovereign ratings were Ba3 by Moody’s and BB- by 
Standard & Poor’s, both considered as non-investment grades. These ratings were lower than Brazil’s, which 
were the lowest among the four EMEs the Fed established swap lines with. There was therefore a likelihood 
that the Fed rejected the Indonesian request due to its weak economic fundamentals. As will be discussed in 
GRIPS Policy Research Center Discussion Paper : 11-18
9 
 
Such capacities of EMEs were likely to depend partly upon the volumes of US Treasuries 
in their foreign exchange reserves, given that if they had disposed of massive amounts of 
US Treasuries due to dollar liquidity shortages this could have seriously damaged the US 
economy. A rise in US Treasury yields would have increased the US government’s fiscal 
burdens, impeding recovery of the US economy. Moreover, the United States was at that 
time setting up a plan to issue new Treasuries, in order to raise 700 billion dollars in public 
funds to deal with the crisis. If EMEs had sold large amounts of US Treasuries at that time, 
this could have thus negatively impacted the United States even more significantly.     
   The four EMEs with which the Fed established swap lines indeed all held large 
volumes of US Treasuries. In September 2008, Brazil, Korea, Mexico and Singapore were 
the 3rd, 11th, 13th and 14th largest foreign holders of US Treasuries, excluding Caribbean 
banking centres and oil-producing countries, and in aggregate accounted for about 9 
percent of US Treasuries held abroad. (In contrast, meanwhile, the amount of US 
Treasuries held by Indonesia was trivial, and it was not even included in the US Treasury 
Department’s list of the 30 largest foreign holders. The volume of Indonesia’s foreign 
exchange reserves amounted to 51 billion dollars in January 2009, only half as big much as 
those of Mexico, which were the smallest among the four EMEs receiving Fed swap lines.) 
It may be uncertain whether the amounts of US Treasuries held by the four EMEs were 
large enough to have significantly impacted the US Treasury markets directly. Yet there 
was a possibility of their disposals of large amounts of US Treasuries triggering 
subsequent massive sales of them.   
 Of course, the likelihood of the four EMEs deliberately selling their US Treasuries in 
order to damage the US economy was not high. Most of all, with the global financial crisis 
on-going, falls in their foreign exchange reserve holdings could have lowered market 
confidence in the countries themselves.16 Declines in the values of the dollar against their 
own currencies due to sales of US Treasuries could have in addition had negative effects 
on their own exports. The volumes of these countries’ US Treasury holdings, especially 
those of Brazil and Korea, had however been decreasing since August 2008, suggesting 
possibility of their selling US Treasuries to defend their own financial stability.17   
 Yet it should be emphasized that the capacities of EMEs to negatively affect the US 
economy were likely to have been only a second consideration of the Fed in its decision to 
establish swap lines with them. Its first consideration was more likely to have been the 
EMEs’ influences in global economic governance. Indeed, as discussed above, the Fed’s 
stance on establishing swap lines with EMEs became positive only after mid-October 2008, 
when it was determined that the first G20 summit would be held. Also, on 11 October 2008 
in a G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors meeting, Korean Finance 
Minister Kang had in fact tried to press the United States to establish a swap line with his 
country by pointing out the possibility of the financial instability in EMEs coming back to 
hit advanced economies as well, using the words ‘reverse spillover’ (MSFK, 2008a); 
nonetheless, the Fed maintained a negative stance on establishing swap lines with EMEs at 
the time.   
                                                                                                                                                   
detail later, however, the soundness of the economic fundamentals of countries requesting swap lines does 
not appear to have been a deciding consideration for the Fed in determining its swap line partners.       
16 Aizenman (2009) points out that EMEs showed strong reluctance in using their foreign exchange reserves 
during the global financial crisis, due to what he called a ‘fear of losing international reserves’. And during 
the crisis the markets showed a tendency of responding to declines in countries’ reserves more sensitively 
than they did to their absolute reserve levels, which constrained reserve use. 
17 Between end-August 2008 and end-October 2008, the volume of US Treasuries held by Brazil dropped 
from 152.6 billion to 141 billion dollars and that of Korea from 42.1 billion to 36.2 billion dollars.   





IV. OTHER FACTORS TO CONSIDER 
 
There may have been some other factors as well that influenced the Fed’s decision to 
establish the swap lines with the four EMEs. In this regard, among others three specific US 
objectives appear to attract most attention: prevention of crisis contagion to systemically 
important EMEs with sound fundamentals, protection of the interests of US banks, and 
preservation of the dollar’s status as the leading international currency. However, the 
impacts of these objectives on the Fed’s decision to establish the swap lines do not appear 
to have been significant. 
 
a. Prevention of crisis contagion to sound and systemically important EMEs 
 
On its announcement of establishing the swap lines with the four EMEs, the Fed officially 
stated that they were ‘designed … to mitigate the spread of difficulties in obtaining US 
dollar funding in fundamentally sound and well managed economies (emphasis added)… 
in response to the heightened stress associated with the global financial turmoil, which has 
broadened to emerging market economies,’ in cooperation ‘with the central banks of these 
four large and systemically important economies (emphasized added)’ (Federal Reserve, 
2008), If this statement is taken at face value, it may be plausible to expect that the Fed 
might play the role of global lender of last resort again in future crises, at least for crisis 
bystander EMEs of systemic importance.   
 At first view, the Fed’s explanation about this background to its establishment of the 
swap lines seems to have well reflected the situation in the world economy at that time. As 
the Fed indicated, the four EMEs were large and systemically important ones. In 2008, the 
economies of Brazil, Korea, Mexico and Singapore were the 10th, 15th, 13th and 42nd 
largest in the world in terms of GDP, the 21st, 12th, 16th and 19th in terms of exports, and 
the 26th, 12th, 15th and 19th in term of imports. Meanwhile, all except Singapore were 
suffering from serious financial instability at the time. Between 12 September 2008 and 22 
October 2008, for example, the exchange rates to the dollar of the Brazilian real, the 
Korean won and the Mexican peso surged from 1.79 to 2.36 reals, from 1,109 to 1,467 
won, and from 10.6 to 13.4 pesos, respectively. The CDS spreads on their five-year 
sovereign bonds also rose dramatically—from 154 bps on 12 September to 586 bps on 24 
October for Brazil, from 136 bps on 12 September to 675 bps on 27 October for Korea, 
and from 165 bps on 12 September to 601 bps on 22 October for Mexico.    
 However, the Fed’s account has notable limitations in fully explaining the background 
of the four swap lines. Firstly, as mentioned earlier, the Fed had never established swap 
lines with any EMEs previously, except for Mexico, which was a US neighbor. The crises 
in the EMEs to which the Fed offered swap lines during the global crisis were not 
exceptional. Korea had needed to request bail-out by the IMF in 1997, and Brazil in 1998, 
2001 and 2002, but they were never offered swap lines by the Fed at those times. 
Meanwhile, the shares of the four EMEs in the world economy had not changed 
substantially between the previous crises and the global crisis. Those of Brazil, Korea, 
Mexico and Singapore had accounted for 2.8, 1.9, 1.2 and 0.3 percent of global GDP, 
respectively, in 1997, and 2.4, 1.9, 1.9 and 0.3 percent in 2007. Therefore, the likelihood 
that the Fed established swap lines with the four EMEs during the global crisis simply 
because of their systemic importance and financial instability was not high.   
 One may argue that the Fed did not establish swap lines with the four EMEs during the 
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previous crises because their economic fundamentals and domestic policies had not been 
sound at those times. This argument is debatable, however, and there was indeed a fierce 
debate over the principal cause of the Korean crisis—and more broadly, of the 1997 Asian 
currency crisis as a whole: whether it was due to domestic problems or to volatile 
international capital flows. Moreover, Singapore was the only country that maintained 
triple A ratings during the global crisis. For Brazil, its Moody’s rating was even Ba1, non-
investment grade, and its Standard & Poor’s rating was also BBB-, the lowest investment 
grade. Mexico’s ratings also reached merely Baa1 and BBB+. And it is meanwhile also 
worth noting that the Fed did not establish a swap line with Hungary, which requested an 
IMF bailout in October 2010, even though Hungary’s Moody’s rating was A2, the same as 
Korea’s, and its S&P’s rating BBB+, the same as Mexico’s. Hungary’s GDP was also the 
world’s 52nd largest, at 156 billion dollars, not so much smaller than Singapore’s 182 
billion dollars. All of these points strongly question the credibility of the Fed’s official 
account that it had established swap lines with EMEs having sound economic 
fundamentals. 
 
b. Protection of the interests of US banks 
 
Meanwhile, Aizenman and Pasricha (2010) also analyse why the Fed provided swap lines 
for only a select four among EMEs, by examining US bank exposures to EMEs, US trade 
exposures to them, their degrees of capital account openness, and their credit histories. 
Their study argues that the exposures of US banks to EMEs were the most important factor 
explaining the swap lines’ establishment, by showing that the shares of the swap 
counterparty EMEs in total US bank foreign claims were significantly higher than those of 
non-swap recipient EMEs. This finding suggests that the main objective of the Fed’s swap 
lines with the four EMEs may have been to protect the interests of US banks.  
 This explanation of the swap lines with the four EMEs has some notable limitations, 
however, so that it cannot account for all four swap lines. Firstly, as the research 
acknowledges, its regression results show the probabilities of inclusion in the Fed’s swap 
lines to have been higher than 50 percent for only two of the four EMEs. It does not 
indicate which EMEs these were, but the data used suggests they were Korea and Mexico, 
to which US bank exposures were 4.2 and 5.5 percent, respectively. The study thus has a 
difficulty in explaining the inclusion in the Fed swap lines of Brazil and Singapore, to 
which US bank exposures reached 2.8 and 2.0 percent only, respectively. 
 It is also ambiguous whether US bank exposure to the four EMEs was large enough to 
lead the Fed to unprecedentedly offer swap lines to them. When Brazil was bailed out by 
the IMF in September 2001, for instance, the Brazilian share in total US bank exposure to 
foreign economies was 4.1 percent, similar to the Korean share during the global crisis of 
4.2 percent. The Fed nonetheless did not provide a swap line to Brazil in September 2001, 
unlike its behavior during the global crisis.   
 
c. Preservation of dollar’s status as leading reserve currency 
 
Finally, it is worth considering the likelihood that the Fed arranged the swap lines with the 
four EMEs in order to help maintain the dollar’s status as the leading international 
currency, given that this provision of dollar liquidity to them might have been expected to 
increase their support for the dollar’s international status. This explanation of the Fed’s 
establishment of the swap lines with the four EMEs seems to have some validity 
particularly for the case of Singapore, home to the second biggest dollar markets in Asia 
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after only Japan. The Monetary Authority of Singapore also actually stated that the swap 
line with the Fed was a precautionary measure to provide dollar liquidity to global 
financial institutions operating in the Singaporean economy (MAS 2008; 2009). 
 Overall, however, the likelihood of this having driven the Fed’s decision to supply the 
swaps appears quite low, given that the dollar’s international status was not significantly 
challenged during the crisis, at least in the short term. Ironically, it was in fact the dollar 
that played the role of the most important safe haven currency at that time. The value of 
the dollar indeed rose during the second half of 2008, and its international status was thus 





This study has provided a political economy analysis of why the US Federal Reserve 
unprecedentedly established swap lines with four EMEs during the global financial crisis. 
As the US subprime crisis evolved into a global one, the centre of global economic 
governance shifted from a limited group of advanced economies to a more inclusive group 
encompassing major EMEs. Meanwhile, in the wake of the crisis the United States came 
into conflict with Europe over how to reform the international monetary and financial 
systems. Under these circumstances the US likely had a strong incentive to reinforce its 
relationships with major EMEs in order to maintain its influence in the new global 
economic governance system, and the Fed swap lines were likely expected to help it 
achieve that goal. The Fed additionally appears to have offered swap lines only to those 
EMEs with the potentials to impinge on the US economy, even among EMEs with growing 
influence in the new global economic governance system. Meanwhile, factors such as 
prevention of crisis contagion to systemically important EMEs with sound fundamentals, 
protection of US bank interests, and preservation of the US dollar’s status as the leading 
international currency do not appear to have had significant impacts on the Fed’s decision 
to establish the swap lines.  
 What do these findings imply for the role of the Fed as an international lender of last 
resort for dollars in the future? Can we expect that it will provide swap lines for EMEs 
again in future crises? This paper judges that be unlikely. As demonstrated here, the Fed’s 
decision to offer the swap lines to the four EMEs was made at a very unique historical 
juncture. It is true that the G20 has been by and large successfully consolidating itself as 
the forum for global economic governance, suggesting that the improved status of EMEs 
in global economic governance is likely to continue to a large extent. Yet there are 
significant differences between the present time and that when the first G20 summit was 
held. As discussed above, when the first G20 summit was called there was a substantial 
divide between US and European interests with regard to reform of the international 
monetary and financial systems. In addition, the crisis at that time had originated within 
the United States itself, and the country was entering its most serious recession since the 
Great Depression of the 1930s while the European debt crisis had not yet emerged. And 
these factors increased the US need to obtain support from EMEs. In contrast, the divide 
                                                 
18 There is, of course, a possibility that the dollar’s international status may decline in the long term, 
especially considering the extremely loose US fiscal and monetary policies in the wake of the crisis. This 
possibility does not appear to be great either, however, given the lack of strong alternatives to the dollar. For 
a comprehensive and systematic review of the debate on the dollar’s future as the leading international 
currency, see Chey (2012).  
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between the United States and Europe over reform of the international monetary and 
financial systems now appears to have narrowed to some extent. At the same time, the 
conflict between them and EMEs appears to have increased, as EMEs have endeavored to 
increase their influences over global economic governance. These changing circumstances 
may reduce the US need to obtain support from EMEs, and thereby lower the likelihood of 
the Fed offering swap lines to EMEs again in the future.   
 This prospect for the future of the Fed swap lines implies for EMEs that the global 
financial safety net should be further strengthened, to prevent the recurrence of systemic 
crises and protect innocent crisis bystanders. It would be too risky to rely on such a 
‘discretionary’ decision of the Fed to make swap lines available during a subsequent 
systemic crisis. In fact, and as mentioned earlier, strengthening of the global financial 
safety net has been on the official agenda of the G20 since its 2010 Seoul Summit. 
Advanced economies have been opposed to this, however, despite strong demand from 
EMEs. It thus appears difficult, in the short term at least, to expect a global lender of last 
resort again in a future crisis.  
 This paper concludes with a brief discussion of one potential important criticism of it. 
It may be argued that the paper’s political economy account of the Fed’s swap lines with 
the four EMEs is problematic, given the fact of the Fed’s independence from the US 
government, whose interests this paper has analyzed as having driven the Fed’s decision to 
provide the swap lines. Yet although the Fed does maintain great independence in terms of 
its domestic monetary policy, it seems highly unlikely that it could adopt an important 
foreign economic policy, such as establishment of swap lines with foreign central banks, 
without consulting on this with the US government.19 Indeed, former Secretary of the 
Treasury George Shultz (Shultz and Dam, 1978, p. 9) once stated: ‘[T]he Fed takes 
direction from the President, through the Treasury Department, on international monetary 
affairs’. And former Staff Director for Monetary and Financial Policy at the Fed Board of 
Governors Stephen Axilrod also noted (Burk and Cairncross, 1992, p. 41): 
 
[T]here is a deep distinction in the U.S. (unlike the U.K.) between international and 
domestic monetary policy: the Fed is totally and utterly independent when making a 
domestic monetary policy decision; not only is there no clearance with the Treasury—to 
attempt it would cause a constitutional crisis. The international arena is more complicated: 
here the Fed’s independence is unknown and has not been fully tested, but in practice it is 
limited. The Treasury controls international finance. 
  
The non-separation of the Fed from the US government for the analytic purposes of this 
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19 In fact, when Korea tried to establish a swap line with the Fed during the global crisis, both Bank of Korea 
and Ministry of Finance officials contacted their US counterparts. 
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